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A TOOTH AND NAIL FIGHT: PERALTA v. 
DILLARD AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
INDIFFERENCE TOWARD EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
EMILY KORUDA* 
Abstract: In Peralta v. Dillard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, denied a prisoner suffering from severe tooth decay and dental 
disease legal recourse from a state prison that had not provided him adequate 
medical treatment. In its six-to-five ruling, the Ninth Circuit ignored more than 
thirty years of precedent when it allowed courts to consider budgetary constraints 
and resource allocation available to prison officials in actions brought by inmates 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In doing so, the court eliminated the option for in-
mates to seek solely monetary damages for Eighth Amendment violations. As a 
result of this decision, prisoners who have suffered injuries due to a prison offi-
cial’s deliberate indifference are left with neither remedy nor recourse. Addition-
ally, the court’s ruling renders ineffective important incentives that had encour-
aged states to improve prison conditions. States can now hide behind their budg-
ets and neglect to improve poor conditions by citing lack of resources as a de-
fense. This Comment explores the majority’s holding that lack of resources may 
in some circumstances justify cruel and unusual prison conditions contrary to the 
Eighth Amendment and Ninth Circuit precedent, and argues that the dissenting 
opinions more accurately reflect precedent in advocating for the constitutionally 
required medical treatment of U.S. prisoners. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cion Adonis Peralta had been incarcerated in several California state 
prisons prior to January 24, 2004, when he was brought to California State 
Prison in Los Angeles County (“Lancaster”).1 Within three days of his arrival 
at Lancaster, Mr. Peralta requested dental care, both verbally and in writing, 
asserting that he needed treatment for his painful cavities and bleeding gums.2 
A few weeks after this initial request, Mr. Peralta had yet to receive care, and 
subsequently filed a written 602 Appeal with the Department of Corrections 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta I), 704 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d en banc, 744 F.3d 1076 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 2 Id. 
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and Rehabilitation.3 Mr. Peralta received a reply to his 602 Appeal notifying 
him that he was being placed on a waiting list for routine care.4 The prison, 
however, was gravely understaffed and, as a result, prisoners on the routine 
care waitlist waited up to twelve months before receiving care.5 Emergency 
dental cases were given higher priority, but Mr. Peralta was never moved to the 
emergency list.6 
On August 23, 2004, Mr. Peralta filed a first formal-level appeal, arguing 
that his several months’ wait for routine care was inadequate, particularly in 
light of his severe pain and continually bleeding gums.7 Pursuant to 602 Ap-
peal procedure, Dr. Sheldon Brooks, a staff dentist, interviewed Mr. Peralta on 
October 15, 2004.8 Dr. Brooks examined the tooth in question and wrote Mr. 
Peralta a prescription for a few tablets of ibuprofen.9 Dissatisfied with this 
treatment, Mr. Peralta submitted his 602 Appeal to the second formal level on 
October 21, 2004.10 Dr. Brooks met with Mr. Peralta twice more between Jan-
uary 25, 2005 and December 23, 2005, yet Dr. Brooks never extracted the 
tooth, nor did he investigate for further cavities or infections.11 Mr. Peralta’s 
final formal appeal was later rejected by the Department of Corrections in Sac-
ramento due to the fact that Dr. Brooks “did not identify [Mr. Peralta’s] dental 
needs as urgent dental care.”12 
Before Mr. Peralta’s third visit to Dr. Brooks, he filed a pro se complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) seeking monetary damages 
against Dr. Brooks, Dr. Thaddeus Dillard, the prison’s Chief Dental Officer, 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id.; Appellant’s Replacement Opening Brief at 8, Peralta I, 704 F.3d 1124 (No. 09-55907) 
[hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]; see State of California Inmate/Parolee Appeal CDCR 602 Form 
(2008–2009), available at https://www.pdffiller.com/en/project/29170820.htm?form_id=17359507. 
Administrative California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 602 Appeal procedure has 
four levels: the informal appeal and three levels of formal review. How to File A CDCR Administra-
tive Appeal, PRISON LAW OFFICE 5, (Sept. 2008), http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/AdminAppeal10-
10-08.pdf. Typically, if a review is appealed at the informal level, the first formal-level appeal is sent 
to the Appeals Coordinator and reviewed by the supervisor of the appellant. Id. If the issue is not 
solved at the first formal level, it can be appealed again for a second formal-level review. Id. at 5–6. 
The warden completes the second formal-level review. Id. If the appellant is not satisfied with the 
second formal-level review, he or she can file a third formal-level appeal, which is sent to the De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation Chief of Inmate Appeals. Id. at 6. 
 4 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1125; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 8. 
 5 Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta III), 744 F.3d 1076, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014) (Christen, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1125. 
 6 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1094 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 7 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1126; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 8. 
 8 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1126. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 10. 
 11 Id. at 12. Two years after this initial request, Mr. Peralta was transferred to Mule Creek State 
Prison where he was ultimately treated for his periodontal disease and had seven cavities filled. See 
Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1090 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 12 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 13 (internal quotations omitted). 
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and Dr. Junaid Fitter, the prison’s Chief Medical Officer.13 Mr. Peralta asserted 
that the doctors violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment by their deliberate indifference to his serious medical 
needs.14 By prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment 
embodies the fundamental and inherent rights of human decency and dignity, 
which in this case is the right to adequate medical treatment.15 
Mr. Peralta secured pro bono counsel on February 19, 2008.16 The case 
went to trial on May 5, 2009 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California, which granted judgment as a matter of law to Dr. Dillard and Dr. 
Fitter.17 The case against Dr. Brooks proceeded.18 Prior to the jury’s delibera-
tion, the judge instructed the jurors that the question of whether the doctor or 
dentist met his duties to Mr. Peralta under the Eighth Amendment must be con-
sidered in light of the personnel and financial resources available to the dentist 
or doctor and whether these resources could be reasonably obtained.19 At the 
close of trial, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Dr. Brooks, finding 
that he did not act with deliberate indifference as to Mr. Peralta’s dental needs, 
which therefore did not result in recognized harm.20 Mr. Peralta appealed, chal-
lenging the jury instructions and the judgments in favor of Dr. Dillard and Dr. 
Fitter.21 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (permitting individuals to bring private causes of action against 
state officials for violations of their constitutionally protected rights); Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1081; 
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 4. To establish a prima facie case under section 1983, a plaintiff 
must show two elements: (1) the action occurred “under color of [law]” and (2) the action is a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986). 
 14 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1081. 
 15 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (prohibit-
ing corporeal punishment in Arkansas prison system). 
 16 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 4. 
 17 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1126. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 1127. The jury instruction read, in pertinent part: 
 Evidence has been presented during the trial regarding dental staffing levels and the 
availability of resources at the Lancaster correctional facility where Plaintiff Peralta 
was incarcerated during the time of his alleged injuries in this case. 
 Whether a dentist or a doctor met his duties to Plaintiff Peralta under the Eighth 
Amendment must be considered in the context of the personnel, financial, and other re-
sources available to him or her which he or she could not reasonably obtain. A doctor 
or dentist is not responsible for services which he or she could not render or cause to be 
rendered because the necessary personnel, financial, and other resources were not avail-
able to him or her which he or she could not reasonably obtain. 
Id. 
 20 Id. at 1126. 
 21 Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1081. 
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On rehearing en banc, addressing the issues of whether the jury instruc-
tions misstated the law and whether Dr. Fitter and Dr. Dillard were deliberately 
indifferent to Mr. Peralta’s serious medical needs, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.22 Reasoning that 
monetary damages cannot be applied against officials who do not have control 
over the resources or budgetary decisions within their facilities, the court held 
that individuals may raise “insufficient resources” as a defense to a claim  for 
damages asserting that a prisoner suffered an Eighth Amendment violation.23 
Prior to this ruling, however, circuit precedent did not recognize lack of re-
sources as a defense for failure to provide constitutionally adequate care for 
prisoners.24 The dissenters argued that this decision would have radical adverse 
consequences for inmates who challenge the cruel and unusual conditions they 
experience in prison.25 
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and procedural his-
tory of Peralta v. Dillard. Part II examines the history of Mr. Peralta’s appeal 
and how the district court decided to instruct the jury on the role that the pris-
on’s budgetary constraints play in the decision-making process. Part III dis-
cusses the Ninth Circuit’s holding that prison officials may raise a cost and 
budgetary constraints defense to justify cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Part IV critiques the majority’s decision and 
demonstrates how the majority neglected to effectuate the basic principles of 
the Eighth Amendment, leaving prisoners who are suffering from serious med-
ical needs abandoned without legal recourse. 
I. THE ROOT OF MR. PERALTA’S DENTAL PROBLEMS 
Within days of arriving at Lancaster, Mr. Peralta made verbal and written 
requests to receive dental treatment for his cavities, bleeding gums, and severe 
pain.26 Having received no response to his complaints, Mr. Peralta filed a 602 
Appeal to the Department of Corrections on July 15, 2004.27 The Department 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 1084, 1088–89. 
 23 Id. at 1084. The court also issued an unpublished memorandum, agreeing with the district 
court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law to Dr. Dillard and Dr. Fitter. See Peralta v. 
Dillard (Peralta II), 520 F. App’x 494, 495 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding a reasonable juror would not have 
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Peralta on his claims against the defendants for delib-
erate indifference). Upon a rehearing en banc, a divided Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the prior 
judgments. Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1084, 1089. 
 24 Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1089 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 25 See id. at 1097 (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Today’s decision thus 
not only forecloses relief to inmates who suffer cruel and unusual punishment, but also encourages 
future constitutional violations.”). 
 26 Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta I), 704 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d en banc, 744 F.3d 
1076 (9th Cir. 2014); Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 8. 
 27 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 8. 
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of Corrections replied on August 20, 2004, and notified Mr. Peralta that he was 
being put on a waiting list for routine care, not on the list for emergency care.28 
The average wait on the routine care list typically lasted between nine and 
twelve months.29 Generally at Lancaster, a prisoner on the emergency care list 
was entitled to receive care before those on the routine care list.30 Yet, the rec-
ord did not indicate the protocol for determining which prisoners received 
spots on the emergency care list.31 
On August 23, 2004, Mr. Peralta filed a first formal-level appeal, arguing 
that his several-month wait for routine care was inadequate.32 On October 15, 
2004, three months after filing his 602 Appeal, Dr. Brooks interviewed Mr. 
Peralta.33 Dr. Brooks took one X-ray of Mr. Peralta’s teeth, reviewed Peralta’s 
health history, and performed a clinical examination on one tooth.34 Finding 
severe bone loss, he scheduled Mr. Peralta for an extraction of the tooth.35 Dr. 
Brooks did not examine any other teeth or investigate for further cavities or 
infections.36 Dr. Brooks then wrote Mr. Peralta a prescription for a few tablets 
of ibuprofen.37 
Mr. Peralta continued to experience constant pain and bleeding gums.38 
As a result, he filed a second formal-level appeal on October 21, 2004, assert-
ing that his dental needs had not been sufficiently addressed.39 On January 25, 
2005, while his second appeal was pending, Mr. Peralta visited Dr. Brooks for 
his scheduled tooth extraction.40 Upon further examination, Dr. Brooks told 
Mr. Peralta that the tooth did not have a cavity and therefore its extraction was 
not necessary.41 Mr. Peralta took Dr. Brooks’s advice and decided against hav-
ing his tooth pulled.42 
On December 23, 2005, nearly eighteen months after Mr. Peralta made 
his initial request for dental care, Dr. Brooks finally cleaned Mr. Peralta’s 
teeth.43 The records from this cleaning indicated that Dr. Brooks found signifi-
cant plaque and calculus buildup, bleeding gums, bone loss, and gingival re-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta III), 744 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Christen, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 31 Id. at 1094. 
 32 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1126. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 10. 
 40 Peralta I, 704 F.3d at 1126. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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cession.44 Dr. Brooks diagnosed Mr. Peralta with advanced periodontitis.45 Dr. 
Brooks, however, did not schedule Mr. Peralta for another appointment to treat 
these discovered ailments.46 Instead, in February 2006, Mr. Peralta was trans-
ferred to Mule Creek State Prison where he was ultimately treated for his peri-
odontal disease and had seven cavities filled, two years after he made his ini-
tial request for treatment at Lancaster.47 
II. THE PATH FROM TOOTH PAIN TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
On March 18, 2005, in the District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, Mr. Peralta filed his section 1983 complaint against Dr. Dillard, Dr. Fit-
ter, and Dr. Brooks for violating his Eighth Amendment right to freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide necessary dental treat-
ment.48 Prior to trial, Mr. Peralta filed his proposed jury instructions, which 
emphasized that the prison’s lack of funding for resources cannot be used as a 
defense for liability under section 1983.49 The defendants made no objection to 
these proposed instructions.50 The district court, however, neglected to use Mr. 
Peralta’s instructions.51 The district court submitted its own version to the jury 
over Mr. Peralta’s objection, stating the opposite of what Mr. Peralta proposed: 
that the jury should consider available financial and other resources when as-
sessing liability under section 1983.52 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 12. 
 45 Id. Periodontitis is an oral bacterial infection that gradually causes inflammation of the gums 
surrounding teeth and can lead to bone loss. Mara S. Meyer et al., A Review of the Relationship Be-
tween Tooth Loss, Periodontal Disease, and Cancer, 19 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 895, 896 
(2008). 
 46 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 12. 
 47 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1090 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). When 
Dr. Brooks examined Mr. Peralta at Lancaster, he did not examine Mr. Peralta’s other teeth or address 
Mr. Peralta’s suspicions that he had other cavities. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 12. 
 48 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 4. 
 49 Id. at 5. Mr. Peralta’s requested jury instruction stated: 
 Evidence has been presented during the trial regarding dental staffing levels and the 
availability of resources at the Lancaster correctional facility where Plaintiff Peralta 
was incarcerated during the time of his alleged injuries in this case. State budgetary 
constraints are not a defense to primary or supervisory liability under Section 1983. 
Specifically, (1) the lack of funding from the State of California for resources at the 
Lancaster facility is not a defense to liability under Section 1983, and (2) the lack of 
staffing or other resources in the dental department at the Lancaster facility is not a de-
fense to liability under Section 1983. 
Id.; see also Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled by Peralta v. Dillard (Per-
alta III), 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (stating that “[b]udgetary constraints, however, do 
not justify cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 50 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 5. 
 51 Id. at 6. 
 52 Id. at 5–6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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After Mr. Peralta presented his evidence, Dr. Dillard, Dr. Fitter, and Dr. 
Brooks moved for directed verdict.53 The district court directed a verdict in 
favor of Dr. Dillard and Dr. Fitter, based on the finding that there was not suf-
ficient evidence that either doctor had actual knowledge of a serious medical 
condition.54 The court did not grant Dr. Brooks’s motion, determining that 
there was sufficient evidence of Dr. Brooks’s deliberate indifference to Mr. 
Peralta’s medical condition for the issue to be presented to a jury.55 
During trial, Dr. Brooks testified that due to understaffing, he spent the 
majority of his day treating patients from the emergency care list.56 If he hap-
pened to have time at the end of a day, he would try to see patients on the rou-
tine care list.57 As a result, patients on the routine care list would typically wait 
approximately twelve months before meeting with a doctor.58 The prison was 
severely understaffed.59 California at the time required one dentist for every 
950 prisoners; the ratio at Lancaster was roughly one dentist for every 1500 
inmates.60  
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. 
Brooks on May 8, 2009, and on May 26, 2009 the district court entered judg-
ment.61 Mr. Peralta then appealed the jury’s verdict to the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. In his appeal, Mr. Peralta argued that the judgment 
in favor of Dr. Brooks was unfounded because the district court erred in in-
structing the jury that lack of resources could be a defense to the § 1983 
claim.62 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 6. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. at 6–7. 
 56 Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1094 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57 See id. According to his testimony, Dr. Brooks confirmed that Mr. Peralta’s infection warrant-
ed him a spot on the emergency waiting list. Id. at 1090. However, Mr. Peralta was instead placed on 
the waiting list for routine dental care. Id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1081 (majority opinion). 
 61 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 7. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Peralta’s 
claims against Dr. Dillard and Dr. Fitter on the grounds that the evidence presented did not establish 
either doctor’s awareness of and indifference to Mr. Peralta’s dental needs. See Peralta III, 744 F.3d 
at 1086–88. 
 62 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 7; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Mr. Peralta also appealed 
the district court’s holding in favor of Dr. Dillard, the Chief Dental Officer, and Dr. Fitter, the Chief 
Medical Officer at Lancaster. See Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta II), 520 F. App’x 494, 495 (9th Cir. 
2013). Serving as the Chief Dental Officer, Dr. Dillard was required to sign Mr. Peralta’s second-level 
appeal, but he failed to do so. Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1087. Dr. Fitter did sign the appeal, but did not 
review Mr. Peralta’s chart before signing. See id. at 1086. 
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III. NO MONEY, NO PROBLEM: “LACK OF RESOURCES” AS A VIABLE 
DEFENSE TO EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
Before approaching Mr. Peralta’s claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit first analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court case of Farmer v. Bren-
nan, which established the conditions that constitute deliberate indifference. 63 
Next, the majority examined Ninth Circuit precedent on the issue of budgetary 
constraints as a justification for cruel and unusual punishment.64 Yet having 
laid this groundwork, the majority then deconstructed these foundational cases 
in an attempt to distinguish Mr. Peralta’s case and set new precedent.65 
Mr. Peralta’s claim, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs, was based on a fundamental Eighth Amendment protection, namely the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.66 In Farmer, the Court addressed 
the issue of whether prison officials may be held liable for deliberate indiffer-
ence under the Eighth Amendment, and held that liability may attach if prison 
officials are aware of or can draw an inference that inmates face a substantial 
risk of serious harm but disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable 
measures to alleviate it.67 A claimant does not have to show that the prison of-
ficial acted or failed to act for the intentional purpose of causing harm.68 Ac-
cording to the Farmer Court, it is sufficient to show that the prison official act-
ed or failed to act despite his or her knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 
harm.69 
Once the Farmer framework had been established, the majority examined 
the controlling cases in the Ninth Circuit, Jones v. Johnson and Spain v. Procu-
nier, which both iterated the basic principle that budgetary constraints are not a 
justification for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.70 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta III), 744 F.3d 
1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 64 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1083. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40 (stating the standard for deliberate 
indifference as “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law”). The Eighth Amendment estab-
lishes, among other things, the elementary principle that the government is responsible for providing 
medical care for incarcerated individuals, a critical component of basic dignity. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted.”); see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2010) (“A prison that de-
prives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the con-
cept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society. If the government fails to fulfill this obli-
gation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation.”). 
 67 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 
 68 Id. at 842. 
 69 Id. 
 70 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled by 
Peralta v. Dillard (Peralta III), 744 F.3d at 1076 (stating that “[b]udgetary constraints, however, do 
not justify cruel and unusual punishment”); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) 
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As Mr. Peralta argued, the principle established in Jones and Spain should 
have required the Ninth Circuit to hold that the district court’s jury instruction 
to allow a lack-of-resources defense was improper and violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights.71 
The majority, however, directed its analysis away from this principle and 
instead focused on the relief granted in these cases.72 In Jones, the plaintiff 
sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages, and in Spain, the case 
centered on injunctive relief.73 Since these cases did not address the issue of a 
plaintiff seeking only monetary damages, the majority determined that they 
were not controlling for Mr. Peralta’s case.74 The majority weakened Mr. Per-
alta’s claim even further by establishing that states, which run prisons like the 
one where Mr. Peralta was held, cannot be held liable for solely monetary 
damages due to their Eleventh Amendment protections.75 Mr. Peralta, there-
fore, could not have been granted the type of redress he was seeking.76 He 
could only sue to order the state to provide additional services.77 He could not 
request compensation for the pain and suffering he endured for nearly two 
years.78 
The majority further investigated the issue of money damages generally 
for Eighth Amendment violations and declared that such damages are retro-
spective, meaning they provide a remedy for something a prison official could 
have done but did not do.79 Thus, the resources available to a prison official at 
the time the prison official was considering an inmate’s treatment are relevant 
to the jury’s finding of deliberate indifference.80 These resources, or lack 
thereof, “define the spectrum of choices that officials had at their disposal” at 
the time they made decisions regarding a prisoner’s treatment plan.81 
Deviating from the Farmer framework, the majority held that a prison of-
ficial charged with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs can avoid 
                                                                                                                           
(determining that “[t]he cost or inconvenience of providing adequate facilities is not a defense to the 
imposition of a cruel punishment”). 
 71 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 3, at 2. 
 72 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1083. 
 73 See id.; Jones, 781 F.2d at 770; Spain, 600 F.2d at 197. 
 74 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1083. 
 75 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also Peralta III, 744 
F.3d at 1084 (“We may not circumvent this protection by imputing the state’s wrongdoing to an em-
ployee who himself has committed no wrong.”). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits lawsuits in fed-
eral courts for monetary damages against non-consenting states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 76 See Peralta III, 744 F.3d at 1084. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. at 1083. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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liability by demonstrating budgetary constraints.82 Thus, under this line of rea-
soning, the Ninth Circuit majority held that the district court’s jury instruction 
was proper and affirmed the directed verdicts in favor of Dr. Fitter and Dr. 
Dillard. 83 The significance of the majority’s ruling is that a prison official may 
now claim a lack of available resources as a viable defense to an Eighth 
Amendment violation.84 Additionally, a court may instruct a jury to consider 
the resources available to prison officials when determining liability due to 
deliberate indifference.85 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CREATED A GRIM OUTLOOK FOR PRISONERS 
ASSERTING EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Incarcerated prisoners are deprived of liberty, but they should not be de-
nied rights tied to their inherent human dignity.86 By allowing a “lack of re-
sources” to stand as an adequate defense, however, the Ninth Circuit failed to 
uphold the fundamental essence of the Eighth Amendment, thus precluding 
inmates suffering cruel and unusual punishment from relief.87 
Judge Morgan Christen and Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz’s opinions, both 
dissenting in part and concurring in part, exposed critical flaws in the majori-
ty’s reasoning.88 Judge Christen first noted how far the majority opinion devi-
ated from the precedent set in Farmer.89 The Farmer Court held that a prison 
official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for refusing to pro-
vide constitutionally required medical care if he or she knows that a prisoner is 
in danger of substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing 
to take reasonable steps to alleviate the harm.90 Yet as Judge Christen rightfully 
asserted in her dissent, the majority ignored this precedent by indiscriminately 
creating a lack-of-resources defense for plaintiffs seeking money damages.91 
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Furthermore, the majority focused on the type of relief Mr. Peralta was 
seeking, and as Judge Christen highlighted, this should not matter.92 Mr. Peral-
ta’s original claim requested only monetary damages.93 He relied on Jones as 
grounds for his entitlement to money damages under section 1983.94 The ma-
jority, however, developed a novel analysis to undermine Mr. Peralta’s argu-
ment and overrule Jones.95 The majority claimed that prisoners could still 
bring section 1983 suits if they sought injunctive relief, tenuously distinguish-
ing Jones on the grounds that Peralta sought only monetary damages.96 Yet as 
Judge Christen pointed out, this reasoning is impractical.97 For prisoners like 
Mr. Peralta, who did not have his periodontal disease treated for two years un-
til he reached Mule Creek State Prison, injunctions do not remedy the past pain 
and suffering that these prisoners are forced to endure due to prolonged medi-
cal neglect.98 
Like Judge Christen, Judge Hurwitz emphasized the majority’s illogical 
abandonment of precedent.99 His dissent also shed important light on the re-
sounding detrimental impact this decision would have on future plaintiffs at-
tempting to assert their Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unu-
sual punishment.100 The majority’s holding effectively renders inmates, who 
are seeking damages for suffering serious medical conditions, helpless.101 The 
Eighth Amendment “prohibits all cruel and unusual punishments, not simply 
those inflicted by officials of states with well-funded prison medical sys-
tems.”102 Yet following this decision, in lawsuits alleging a failure to provide 
constitutionally adequate medical care for prisoners, state actors can present a 
lack of resources as a defense.103 And, as Judge Hurwitz noted, that defense 
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will likely succeed.104 Furthermore, Judge Hurwitz’s dissent highlighted how 
the majority’s holding will encourage constitutional violations moving for-
ward.105 States will now have a way to avoid paying damages for depriving 
prisoners of the constitutionally required level of care, and as a result, there 
will be little incentive to increase appropriations for such care.106 
CONCLUSION 
By holding that it is proper to consider the resources available to a prison 
official who may not have budgetary authority in a section 1983 action, the 
decision in Peralta jeopardizes an inmate’s ability to seek redress for Eighth 
Amendment violations. The majority’s decision erodes individual Eighth 
Amendment protections and strikes down years of sound precedent. This ulti-
mately gives government actors license to provide constitutionally inadequate 
and sub-standard treatment for prisoners with virtually no legal repercussions. 
As a result, inmates like Mr. Peralta are left stranded by the legal system, una-
ble to collect monetary damages for injuries and illnesses suffered at the ex-
pense of a prison official’s deliberate indifference to their medical needs. Pris-
oners may be deprived of their rights to liberty, but they should not be denied 
their inherent human dignity. 
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